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The Effects of an Uncertain Abandonment Value on the Investment Decision  
 
Abstract 
Using a three-factor stochastic real option model framework, this paper examines the effects of 
abandonment on the investment decision. Abandonment is classified according to whether the 
opportunity arises for an active operating asset post-investment, or for holding the project 
opportunity pre-investment. Separate analytical models are developed for the alternative forms of 
abandonment optionality. Numerical sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of a post-
investment abandonment opportunity makes the investment opportunity appear to be more 
attractive because of the abandonment option value, but not by a considerable amount. Also, in 
contrast to the standard real option finding, an abandonment value volatility increase produces a 
project value threshold fall owing to the increase in the abandonment option value.  
 
JEL Classifications: D81, G31, H25 
Keywords: Real Option Analysis, Abandonment Value, Post/Pre Investment. 
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The Effects of an Uncertain Abandonment Value on the Investment Decision 
 
We investigate the comparative significance of abandonment optionality, available at any time 
during one of the two distinct stages, before the investment event or afterwards for an operating 
asset. The more typical, post-investment abandonment optionality becomes available as a 
consequence of making an actual investment with an incurred cost and operating the asset. 
Justifiable exercise for this option occurs at any time following the investment event whenever 
the foregone project value including its embedded option is more than compensated by the 
abandonment value rendered by the termination. In contrast, the less commonly examined pre-
investment abandonment optionality becomes available only as a consequence of holding the 
project investment opportunity. Initially, these distinct options, representing the investment and 
abandonment opportunity, respectively, are held simultaneously.  For exercise to be 
economically justified, the sum value of both of these forms of optionality is sacrificed in 
exchange for the net investment value, if the investment optionality is exercised, or for the 
abandonment value, if the abandonment optionality is exercised. In determining the conditions 
that favour exercising pre-investment abandonment, the foregone value of the investment 
opportunity needs to be accommodated as well as the received abandonment value. The two 
distinct formulations, one each for the post- and pre-investment cases, are both constructed on 
three distinct sources of uncertainty, the project value, investment cost and abandonment value, 
and apply American perpetuity option framework to generate the optimal decision thresholds. By 
incorporating uncertainty and managerial flexibility from the discretion in selecting the 
investment and abandonment timing decisions, the formulations characterize a typical real option 
model except for the partly recoverable sunk investment cost. 
 
An implicit assumption of many real option analyses is treating the project uncertain cash flow 
stream as if it continues indefinitely. In reality, managers have the potential to shut a project 
down as soon as the prevailing cash flows signify the end of its economic life, so the post-
investment abandonment opportunity represents a managerial option embedded in the operating 
asset, which is exercised whenever the expected present value of residual cash flows is 
sufficiently lower than the value rendered by abandoning the project. Also, including the 
inherent abandonment opportunity may be critical in determining the timing of the investment 
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commitment or when comparing two alternative technologies because of the economic age 
differences. The importance of a stopping event for a deterministic capital budgeting model is 
possibly first raised in a series of analytical studies on depreciation and replacement, Preinreich 
(1938, 1939, 1940), and subsequently by Robichek and Van Horne (1967) who acknowledge the 
importance of abandonment as a valuable source of cash flow capable of altering the investment 
policy. Dyl and Long (1969) recognize the flexibility value stemming from allowing the 
abandonment timing to be variable, with extensions to the field of replacement by Gaumitz and 
Emery (1980) and Howe and McCabe (1983). 
 
Stochastic formulations involving abandonment optionality similarly demonstrate its impact on 
the timing decision. Although Bonini (1977) uses numerical methods to solve a dynamic 
programming model comprising two stochastic factors, subsequent contributions tend to adopt a 
real option methodology and many derive their findings analytically. McDonald and Siegel 
(1985) and Myers and Majd (1990) establish that abandonment can be represented as a put 
option and that the project life is not fixed but determined by the decision to abandon. Based on 
the exchange option framework of Margrabe (1978), McDonald and Siegel (1986) consider 
optimal scrapping.  Alvarez (1999) establishes that irreversible exit is viable only when the 
productive project value falls below the abandonment option value. Mauer and Ott (1995) 
include salvage value in a productive asset replacement model, while Dobbs (2004) deduces its 
value from the operating cost threshold. By considering alternative ordered forms of flexibility 
including abandonment, Keswani and Shackleton (2006) show the significance of the 
abandonment option in reducing the investment timing trigger thereby prompting earlier 
exercise, a finding endorsed by Wong (2012). 
 
A parallel strand of enquiry on the abandonment optionality for a productive asset treats 
abandonment not as an irreversible exit but as a reversible temporary state with an embedded call 
option that allows the productive state to be reinstated. In this representation, entry and exit are 
interpreted as reversible consecutive states possibly along an infinite chain. The earliest exponent 
of a reversible entry-exit model seems to be Mossin (1968), who determines the one-time 
threshold levels for operating and laying-up a productive asset. Dixit (1988) enlarges the scope 
of this representation  by incorporating the initial investment and final scrapping decisions for 
5 
 
the productive asset as well as temporary operating and laying-up, with extensions by Dixit 
(1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who demonstrate the presence of hysteresis arising between 
the operating and lay-up states. Paxson (2005) incorporates abandonment in a real asset option 
model involving several different states, assuming fixed negative abandonment values. By 
treating the productive asset as divisible, the endowed capital can be optimally adjusted in line 
with the uncertain output price, which leads to a sequence of investment and divestment 
decisions. In this way, Alvarez (2011) identifies for constant investment and abandonment costs 
the conditions for acquiring and divesting a marginal unit of capital as well as the existence of 
hysteresis. 
 
Only a few authors consider stochastic abandonment (or exit) costs. Clark and Rousseau (2002) 
examine stochastic abandonment costs for an on-going project.  Adkins and Paxson (2010) treat 
operating cost and abandonment value as two distinct stochastic factors in analyzing the effect of 
their interaction in making replacement decisions. 
 
Whilst these developments assume geometric Brownian motion, other authors determine their 
findings based on a mean reversion process. Biekpe et al. (2003) treat the net cash flows as mean 
reverting and derive values for the abandonment option. By examining  entry and exit decisions 
under a stochastic mean reverting price variable,  Tsekrekos (2010) shows that both the entry and 
exit decisions are significantly altered relative to the standard model, which is endorsed and 
extended by Dias and Nunes (2011) and Dias et al. (2015). 
 
By considering abandonment as an opportunity emerging as a consequence of holding an active 
asset and the result of making a costly investment, these studies focus primarily on post-
investment abandonment. However, an abandonment option can exist before the investment 
event is exercised, which we refer to here as pre-investment abandonment. Although the 
abandonment option for realizing the after-use re-sale value of project assets in scrap-metal and 
second-hand markets due to deteriorating conditions is well recognized, Trigeorgis (1996), pre-
investment optionality is rarely examined despite its relevance for the sale of technological and 
R&D patents instead of their exploitation, for the marketing of energy and mineral leases instead 
of their development, and for the sale of vacant plots instead of real estate developments. Our 
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aim is to raise awareness of pre-investment abandonment by evaluating its impact on the 
investment decision compared with that for post-investment abandonment. Despite post-
investment optionality receiving most of the attention, we show that its effect on the investment 
decision is rather minimal (at least for our base parameter values), while the impact of pre-
investment optionality is considerably greater. Further, we demonstrate that for most threshold 
levels, there is a near constant difference between the threshold for the project value investment 
cost ratio and that for the abandonment value investment cost ratio. Our second contribution 
arises from developing quasi-analytical threshold solutions for the three-factor models. The 
scope for most of the analytical enquiries mentioned above is confined to a single factor 
representation, either by design, by assumption or by recourse to the Margrabe (1978) exchange 
framework. This restriction is limiting, since it ignores alternative but potentially important 
sources of uncertainty and avoids addressing the interaction amongst the three stochastic factors. 
By treating the project value, investment cost and abandonment value as stochastic, our models 
show that the correlation amongst the factors has an insignificant effect on the timing decision 
for the post-investment abandonment model, but a significant impact for the pre-investment 
abandonment model. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. The two models of post- and pre-investment 
optionality are formulated and analytically developed in the next section. This is followed by a 
numerical sensitivity analysis on the two models, from which we obtain some of the more 
important findings. The final section is a conclusion. 
 
1 The Models 
A firm in a monopoly position is considering an investment opportunity for a project that renders 
its value following the instantaneous expenditure of a single investment cost. The overall 
investment opportunity including the project itself is endowed with two types of abandonment 
option. First, once the project is realized, the firm subsequently has the opportunity of foregoing 
the project value and obtaining instead an abandonment value. Second, before the project is 
realized, the firm has the possibility of foregoing the investment opportunity by pre-selling the 
project concept at a market price. The contrast between the two representations invites an 
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examination of the economic outcomes to assess the extent that their consequences are similar or 
different. 
   
The project life-cycle can be separated into two distinct stages, first and second, occurring 
immediately before and after the investment expenditure, respectively. During the stage-1, the 
firm possesses the option to abandon the investment opportunity by selling the project concept as 
an option to invest in the project. Selling the project concept presumes that the value inherent in 
the concept can be monetarized in some way, such as for example a patent, a right to build on 
vacant land or a lease to extract resources, and that the concept is valuable in the eyes of the 
other players in the wider industry. The decision adopted during the stage-1 is selected from 
amongst the three alternatives of exercising the project opportunity, exercising the abandonment 
opportunity, or waiting for new information. The selection is decided by the relative magnitudes 
of the two option values, which are predicated on the prevailing project value as well as the 
investment expenditure and the benefits from abandonment.  
 
During the second stage immediately following the investment expenditure, the firm possesses 
an abandonment option as a direct consequence of operating the asset. Exercising this option 
enables the firm to exchange the operating project for its abandonment value. This presumes that 
the project as an asset can be liquidated in some way either because its physical value can be 
captured through the second-hand or scrap-metal markets, or by transferring the asset to an 
alternative geographic region. For an operating project, a performance assessment can form the 
basis for deciding whether it should be continued or abandoned, and the choice is predicated on 
the relative prevailing magnitudes of the project value and the abandonment option value. 
Although an abandonment opportunity may exist for both stages, we examine the economic 
consequences of including the option in stages-1 and -2 separately. Clearly, the stage-2 
opportunity cannot occur unless the stage-1 investment opportunity is exercised. 
 
There are three stochastic factors specified in our model, denoted by V , K  and X , representing 
the project present value, the investment cost and the abandonment value, respectively. Each of 
the three factors is described by a geometric Brownian motion process with drift. If   denotes a 
generic factor with    1 2 3, , , ,V K X     , then: 
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 d d dt z        , (1) 
where   denotes the instantaneous drift term per unit of time,   the instantaneous volatility 
per unit of time, and d z  is an increment of the standard Wiener process. Dependence amongst 
the three stochastic factors is described by the instantaneous covariance term 
ij i j    for 
, 1,2,3;i j i j  , where Cov , di j ij i j i j t          and , 1i j  , , 1,2,3;i j i j  . 
 
Formulating the three factors of interest according to a geometric Brownian motion process has 
the merit of generating solutions consistent with other real option models. However, it does 
entail recognizing that the values adopted by each factor are confined to the positive domain. 
While this assumption is plausible for the project value and the investment expenditure, the same 
cannot be said for the abandonment value. There are circumstances, such as the scrap metal 
value for retired ships and plant & equipment either sold to third parties or exported abroad, that 
support this assumption, but there are others, such as the decommissioning payments required for 
a redundant nuclear power station or the costs of decontaminating a brown-field site where the 
abandonment value is clearly negative. We confine our attention to the former rather than the 
latter. 
 
The particular context under study, such as waiting for additional information or project 
continuance, is evaluated from formulating its expected present value. In evaluating the present 
value, not only do we need to determine any value attributable to the particular context, but we 
also need to include the value of any embedded options arising owing to abandonment. Now, the 
abandonment option value is ascertained from the dynamic properties of the factors pertaining to 
the context, which, in principle, can be the project present value, the investment cost and the 
abandonment value. By denoting this option value generically by F , then  , ,F F V K X . By 
applying Ito’s lemma to (1), the valuation relationship for F  is specified by: 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1
2 2 22 2 2
2 2 2
0.
V K X
VK V K VX V X KX K X
V K X
F F F
V K X
V K X
F F F
VK VX KX
V K V X K X
F F F
V K X rF
V K X
  
        
  
  
 
  
  
  
     
  
    
  
  (2) 
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where the parameters 
V , K  and X  denote the respective risk neutral drift terms
1
, and r  the 
risk-free rate. By extension, see Adkins and Paxson (2011), McDonald and Siegel (1986), a 
product power function involving the three factors V , K  and X  can be shown to be the solution 
to the three dimensional valuation relationship. The generic valuation function for the 
abandonment option is: 
  , ,F V K X AV K X   , (3) 
where A  is a generic coefficient, and  ,   and   are the respective generic power parameters 
for V , K  and X . While 0A  , since an option value is always non-negative, the power 
parameters can be of either sign contingent on the particular context. If a factor plays no role in 
determining the option value and is effectively absent, its parameter value is set to equal zero. 
The option value (3) satisfies the valuation relationship with characteristic root equation Q : 
 
       2 2 21 1 12 2 2, , 1 1 1
0.
V K X
VK V K VX V X KX K X
V K X
Q
r
           
           
     
     
  
    
 (4) 
 
In formulating a model purposeful for discriminating amongst the various choices, we first need 
to bear in mind the distinction between post- and pre-investment abandonment. Model I is 
specified to represent post-investment abandonment, which assumes that the opportunity is only 
available during stage-2. Here, the abandonment option only exists after making the investment 
and there is no similar opportunity before making the investment. Model II, on the other hand, is 
specified to represent pre-investment abandonment. Here, the opportunity only exists during 
stage-1 when it is feasible to forego the investment opportunity in exchange for its abandonment 
value, but only prior to the investment expenditure and not beyond, since the abandonment 
option lapses with the exercise of the investment option. In our notation, the first subscript, 1 or 
2, is used to designate the model version, I or II, respectively. 
 
For Model I, we need to distinguish the decisions made during stage-1 from those made during 
stage-2. A second subscript for Model I variables, labelled 1 or 2, is inserted to designate the 
                                                 
1
 Some authors assume =r-, without a risk adjustment.  It is likely that these drifts may be related for some 
types of equipment such as cars, but not perhaps for ships, but we ignore these possibilities.  
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relevant stage. Since the stage-2 abandonment option is available, the overall model solution is 
determined by the backwardation principle. The stage-2 analytical behaviour is examined first 
before progressing to analyzing stage-1 behaviour, since the stage-2 results impact on the stage-1 
solution. In contrast, the critical characteristic of Model II is the distinction between the 
investment decision and the abandonment decision made at stage-1. It is required to identify for 
stage-1 the conditions signalling a switch from the continuance to the project state by exercising 
the investment option and those signalling a switch from continuance to the abandonment state 
by exercising the abandonment option. The second subscript is inserted in Model II variables to 
designate the relevant decision, which is 1 for investment and 2 for abandonment. 
 
1.1 Model I 
In this model, the only available abandonment opportunity resides at stage-2, and there is no 
abandonment opportunity at stage-1. The stage-2 option emerges as a consequence of exercising 
the project opportunity and making the investment commitment. When investigating the 
justification for a stage-2 abandonment, we treat the previous investment expenditure as a sunk 
cost, since it exerts no influence over the decision to abandon and plays no role in determining 
the abandonment option value. We assume once abandoned there is no subsequent investment 
opportunity.  This is appropriate for a bankrupt firm, or where X is far below K and subsequent 
investment funding is problematical. Instead, the abandonment choice is decided by the 
prevailing levels of the present value for the project and the value obtained through 
abandonment. Although sunk, the investment cost is not completely irrecoverable, since the 
expenditure may be partially reimbursed through the receipt of the abandonment value. For 
Model I, the first subscript 1 refers to the model, while the second designates the stage. 
 
Stage-2 
The stage-2 option function depends on the project value V  and the abandonment value X , but 
not on the investment cost K . From  (3), the abandonment option is defined as: 
   12 1212 12,F V X A V X
   (5) 
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Stage-2 abandonment is justified whenever the prevailing value for V  is sufficiently low while 
that for X  is sufficiently high, since the firm would have to be convinced of the expected net 
benefits accruing from sacrificing the operating project value for the abandonment value. 
Moreover, the motivation justifying a stage-2 abandonment intensifies and the corresponding 
option value increases as V  continues to decline or X  to rise. This suggests that 
12F  is a 
monotonic decreasing and increasing function of  V  and X , respectively, and entails that 
12 0   and 12 0  . 
  
Owing to value conservation, stage-2 abandonment is economically warranted when the 
composite asset values just prior and after exercise are in balance. Just prior to exercise, the 
value is composed of the sum of the project present value and the abandonment option value. At 
the instant of exercise, this composite amount is being sacrificed to acquire the benefit of the 
abandonment value. If the threshold levels signalling exercise are denoted by 12Vˆ  and 12Xˆ  for the 
project present value and the abandonment value, respectively, then the composite asset value 
just prior to exercise is specified by  12 12 12 12ˆ ˆ ˆ,V F V X , and the asset value just after exercise by 
12Xˆ . It follows that the value matching relationship is defined by: 
 12 1212 12 12 12 12
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆV A V X X   . (6) 
For an optimal exercise, the smooth pasting or first order conditions must be satisfied. Since 
there are two factors of interest, there are two smooth pasting conditions, one for each factor, V  
and X , respectively. These can be expressed as: 
 12 1212 12 12 12 12
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0V A V X   , (7) 
 12 1212 12 12 12 12
ˆ ˆ ˆA V X X   . (8) 
The conjecture 
12 0   and 12 0   is corroborated by (7) and (8), respectively, since 12 0A  . By 
inspecting (6)-(8), we conclude that 
12 12 1   , which implies that 21F  is a homogenous 
degree-1 function. The parameter 
12  is evaluated as the negative root solution to (4): 
    12 12 12 12,0,1 0Q Q     . (9) 
Also: 
12 
 
 12 12
12
12
ˆ
ˆ
1
X
V





, (10) 
 
121
12
12
12 12
1
1
A


 

 
  
  
. (11) 
 
Stage-1 
By backwardation, the stage-1solution is obtained from the stage-2 result. The decision on offer 
at stage-1 is whether or not to exercise the option to invest in the project opportunity. Since 
exercising the investment option entails committing an investment expenditure K  in exchange 
for acquiring the project present value V  together with the embedded abandonment option 
12F , 
the value of the investment option is determined by the future cash flows that the stage-2 
abandonment option renders. This suggests that the investment option value, which is denoted by 
11F , is function of V , K  and X , so from (3)  11 11 , ,F F V K X . We anticipate the power 
parameters for the three factors to adopt particular signs. An increase in the project present value, 
a decrease in the investment cost or an increase in the abandonment value each contribute to 
making the investment opportunity appear to be more attractive, with a consequential rise in the 
option value. This suggests that the option value is an increasing function of V , a decreasing 
function of K , and an increasing function of X ,  and that their respective parameters should 
obey the condition: 
11 0  , 11 0   and 11 0  . 
 
The respective asset values immediately before and after exercise are in balance due to value 
conservation. Before exercise, the stage-1 owned asset is the investment opportunity with value 
11F . After exercise, the composite asset is the project having a net value V K  together with its 
embedded abandonment option with value 
12F .  If the threshold levels signalling exercise are 
denoted by 11Vˆ , 11Kˆ  and 11Xˆ  for the three factors, respectively, then the value matching 
relationship is specified by: 
 11 11 11 12 1211 11 11 11 11 11 12 11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X V K A V X       . (12) 
The three first order conditions for optimality, one for each factor respectively, can be expressed 
as: 
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 11 11 11 12 1211 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X V A V X       , (13) 
 11 11 1111 11 11 11 11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X K     , (14) 
 11 11 11 12 1211 11 11 11 11 12 12 11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X A V X      . (15) 
The smooth pasting conditions (13)-(15) satisfy the conjecture on the sign conditions. Further, 
combining (12)-(15) reveals that 
11 11 11 1     . This establishes that 11F  is a degree-1 
homogenous function and that the solution can be expressed completely in terms of the threshold 
ratios 11 11 11
ˆ ˆvˆ V K  and 11 11 11
ˆ ˆxˆ X K . By reframing the formulation in terms of v  and x , we 
obtain from (12) the revised value matching relationship: 
 11 11 12 12
11 11 11 11 12 11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1A v x v A v x      . (16) 
Associated with the two factors, v  and x , there are two corresponding smooth pasting 
conditions that can be expressed as, respectively: 
 11 11 12 1211 11 11 11 11 12 12 11 11ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA v x v A v x
      , (17) 
 11 11 12 1211 11 11 11 12 12 11 11ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA v x A v x
     . (18) 
 
The coefficient 
11A in (16) is eliminated through (17) to yield: 
 12 1211 12 11
11 12 11 11
11 11
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1
v A v x 
  
 

 
 
 (19) 
The project value threshold, normalized by the investment cost, is a combination of two 
components. The first component  11 11 1    is the standard real option result and denotes the 
threshold level in the absence of a stage-2 abandonment opportunity, since 
12 0A   signifies 
abandonment as being unavailable. The second component reflects the impact of the stage-2 
abandonment opportunity on the investment decision. Since 
11 0   and 12 0  , this component 
is always negative. This shows that in the presence of a stage-2 abandonment opportunity, the 
project value threshold signalling investment  
11vˆ  is lower than that in its absence. Projects 
having a positive stage-2 abandonment value will always appear to be more attractive than those 
that do not, since the abandonment value creates additional value at stage-2, which effectively 
lowers the investment cost and consequently the project value threshold. 
 
14 
 
Alternatively, 
11A  can be eliminated through (18) to yield: 
 12 121211 12 11 11
11
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1v A v x 


 
   
 
. (20) 
Similarly, the project value threshold, 
11vˆ , is a combination of two components. The first 
represents the zero NPV solution where the project value exactly balances the investment cost, 
while the second reflects the impact of the abandonment option on the project value threshold. 
The scale and sign of this impact is governed by the relative magnitudes of the parameters 
11  
and 
12 , which are both judged to be positive. Although 12  remains constant for all 
abandonment value thresholds, the magnitude of  
11  varies with the threshold level but is 
confined to the positive domain. The abandonment value threshold is expected to exert only a 
minimal effect on the investment option value for relatively low threshold levels, which suggests 
that 
11  would adopt values correspondingly close to zero. However, as the abandonment value 
threshold increases and becomes more significant, the investment option value is increasingly 
influenced by the threshold, and consequently the magnitude of 
11  grows. If the abandonment 
value threshold becomes exceedingly large relative to the investment cost, than a value of 
11 12   becomes a possibility. For this extreme case, the project value threshold falls below the 
investment cost yielding an outcome that is less than the zero NPV solution. 
 
The Q  function (4) for the stage-1 representation is specified as: 
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   
   
     

 (21) 
 
The stage-1 investment policy model is composed of three constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 
reduced form value matching relationships, (19) and (20), and (iii) the Q   function, (21). For any 
given abandonment value threshold  
11xˆ , it is possible to determine the project value threshold 
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11vˆ from the model, as well as the two parameters 11 and 11 . In this way, the threshold boundary 
linking 
11vˆ  with 11xˆ  can be constructed. 
 
1.2 Model II 
 
In this model, an opportunity exists for abandoning the investment opportunity but only during 
the pre-investment stage-1. Unlike Model I, no opportunity exists during the post-investment 
stage-2 for abandoning the project. While holding an investment opportunity, the firm may have 
the opportunity for selling the implied option and receiving in exchange a so-called abandonment 
value. If a fundamental asset underpinning the investment opportunity is in some sense re-
saleable, then perhaps because of proprietary ownership in the form of a patent, license or real 
estate planning permission, the owner may hold the option to sell the investment opportunity in 
exchange for its so-called abandonment value, given that a sufficiently complete market exists. 
This assumes the proprietary asset is not owner-specific, like human capital.  In these 
circumstances, the firm in fact holds two options. The first is the original investment opportunity, 
which when exercised realizes the net project value. The second is the abandonment option, 
which arises owing to the possession of an investment opportunity and is monetarized because of 
the tradability of an underpinning re-saleable asset. Armed with these two options, the firm can 
decide at any instant to exercise the investment opportunity, or to exercise the abandonment 
opportunity, or to wait until the arrival of more decisive information. For Model II, the first 
subscript 2 refers to the model, while the second designates the decision where 1 = invest and 
2 = abandon. 
 
The investment option value depends not only on the levels of the two stochastic factors, the 
project value V  and investment cost K , just like any other investment option, but also on the 
level of the abandonment value X . This is because a relatively high X  value is expected to 
make an early investment  less attractive
2
. As X increases, the relative project attractiveness 
                                                 
2
 In our base case, we assume zero correlation between V, K and X, that is X may not be reflective of real option 
investment values.  This assumption is relaxed in Figures 5 and 10. 
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wanes because both the investment cost and the abandonment value have to be sacrificed to 
obtain the project value. As a corollary, a decline in X  enhances the project attractiveness. In a 
similar way, the abandonment option value depends not just on the abandonment value but on 
the other two factors as well. The option to abandon the investment opportunity becomes more 
attractive for relatively low V  and high K  values, but less attractive for relatively high V  and 
low K  values. Consequently, the investment option function 
21F  and the abandonment option 
function 
22F  are both functions of V , K  and X . The combined option value (ROV) owned by 
the firm is given by: 
     21 21 21 22 22 2221 22 21 22 21 22, , , ,F F F V K X F V K X A V K X A V K X
          . (22) 
Since the two option values are individually non-negative, the coefficients 
21 22, 0A A  . Also, 
investment is only economically justifiable for a sufficiently high V  with simultaneously low K  
and X  values. Moreover, the incentive to exercise the investment option rises for increases in V  
but for decreases in both K  and X . This suggests that 
21 0   and 21 21, 0.   Similarly, a 
sufficiently low V  with simultaneously high K  and X  values makes the abandonment 
opportunity become attractive, and its attractiveness increases for decreases in V  but for 
increases in both K  and X . This suggests that 
22 0   and 22 22, 0   .  
 
Prior to an investment or abandonment event, the firm holds the two options representing the 
investment and abandonment optionality, respectively. Either at the investment exercise event or 
the abandonment exercise event, the firm foregoes the two options and obtains in exchange the 
net investment value, given by V K , or the abandonment value, X , respectively. At the 
investment exercise event, the thresholds for the three factors, V , K  and X , when the 
investment opportunity is exercised, are denoted by 21Vˆ , 21Kˆ  and 21Xˆ , respectively. Then, 
because of value conservation, the value matching relationship at the investment event is given 
by: 
 21 21 21 22 22 2221 21 21 21 22 21 21 21 21 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X A V K X V K        . (23) 
Associated with (23), there are 3 smooth pasting conditions, one for each factor, which can be 
expressed as: 
 21 21 21 22 22 2221 21 21 21 21 22 22 21 21 21 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X A V K X V        , (24) 
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 21 21 21 22 22 2221 21 21 21 21 22 22 21 21 21 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA V K X A V K X K         , (25) 
 21 21 21 22 22 2221 21 21 21 21 22 22 21 21 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0A V K X A V K X        . (26) 
From (23)-(26), it can be seen that 
21 21 21 1      and 22 22 22 1     , which implies that 
21F  and 22F  are homogenous degree-1 functions. Because of this, the value matching 
relationship (23) can be expressed without loss in terms of the ratios the 21 21 21
ˆ ˆvˆ V K  , the 
project value intensity, and 21 21 21
ˆ ˆxˆ X K , the abandonment value intensity : 
 21 21 22 22
21 21 21 22 21 21 21
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1A v x A v x v      . (27) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions, for v  and x , respectively, are: 
 21 21 22 2221 21 21 21 22 22 21 21 21ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA v x A v x v
      , (28) 
 21 21 22 2221 21 21 21 22 22 21 21ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0A v x A v x
      . (29) 
Since 
21A  and 22A  are non-negative, then from (28) and (29), 21 0   and 22 0   provided 
21 22 22 21    . By using (28) and (29), the coefficients 21A  and 22A  are eliminated from (27) to 
yield: 
 21 22 22 21
21
21 22 22 21 22 21
vˆ
   
     


  
. (30) 
We see from (30) that 
21
ˆ 1v   provided 21 22 22 21    . Also, if 21 0  , then  21 21 21ˆ 1v    , 
which is the standard real option solution for an investment opportunity in the absence of any 
stage-1 abandonment option.  
 
The stage-1 abandonment option is exercised at the thresholds for V , K  and X , denoted by  
22
ˆ ,V  22Kˆ  and 22Xˆ , respectively. We would expect that for any given threshold levels where 
21 22
ˆ ˆK K  and 21 22
ˆ ˆX X , 21 22
ˆ ˆV V , since exercising the investment and the abandonment 
opportunities warrants the threshold level for the project value to be sufficiently high and low, 
respectively. The value matching relationship, expressed in terms of the threshold ratios 
22 22 22
ˆ ˆvˆ V K  and 22 22 22
ˆ ˆxˆ X K , is specified by: 
 21 21 22 2221 22 22 22 22 22 22ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA v x A v x x
     . (31) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions, for v  and x , respectively, are: 
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 21 21 22 22
21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0A v x A v x      , (32) 
 21 21 22 22
21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA v x A v x x      .  (33) 
Since 
21A  and 22A  are non-negative, then from (32) and (33), 21 0   and 22 0   provided 
21 22 22 21    . By using (32) and (33), the coefficients 21A  and 22A  are eliminated from (31) to 
yield: 
 
21 22 21 22 22 21        . (34) 
If indeed 
21 0   and 22 0  , then 21 22 22 21    . Also, 
 
   
21 22
21
21 22 22 21
ˆ 1v
 
   

 
  
. (35) 
 
The characteristic root equations for this model are: 
    21 21 21 21 21 21 21, ,1 , 0Q Q         , (36) 
    22 22 22 22 22 22 22, ,1 , 0Q Q         . (37) 
The functions 21Q  and 22Q  take the same form as 11Q , (21) . 
 
 
The stage-1 investment policy for Model II is composed of 8 equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 value 
matching relationships, (27) and (31), (iii)-(vi) the 4 smooth pasting conditions, (28), (29), (32) 
and (33), and (vii) and (viii) the two Q  functions, (36) and (37). Using these equations, it is 
feasible to solve for the upper and lower threshold levels for v , 
21vˆ  and 22vˆ , for a specified x  
threshold level and to construct the upper and lower policy boundaries.  
2 Numerical Illustrations 
Although the model analysis has revealed some useful properties, further insights into the 
behaviour of the models can be gained through the application of numerical simulations. These 
numerical analyses are founded on the base case values for the parameters specified in both 
Model I and II,  presented in Table 1. It needs to be recognized that the distributional properties 
for the abandonment value presented in Table 1 are identical regardless of whether the focus is 
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on pre- or post-investment abandonment. This is just a numerical convenience that enables the 
consequences for the two models to be directly compared, and should not be interpreted as a 
reflection of reality. 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
2.1 Model I 
The sensitivity analysis for Model I starts with the results for the stage-2 abandonment 
opportunity. Using the base case values, the crucial stage-2 solution values can be evaluated 
from (9)-(11), 
12 1.1279   , 12 12ˆ ˆ 0.5300v x   and 12 0.2297A  . The stage-2 abandonment 
option is exercised for a prevailing project value less than 53.00% of the abandonment value. 
These solution values for 
12  and 12A  are fed into the Model I formulation composed of (19)-
(21) to generate the boundary linking the abandonment threshold 
11xˆ  to the project value 
threshold 
11vˆ , both of which are expressed as ratios of the investment cost threshold. The 
generated boundary is presented in Figure 1, which also exhibits some illustrative values. This 
reveals that the policy boundary for the stage-1 investment opportunity is downward sloping, 
with increases in the abandonment threshold accompanied by decreases in the project value 
threshold. The greatest project value threshold occurs for a zero abandonment threshold and 
equals the result in the absence of any stage-2 abandonment opportunity. Projects having a post-
investment abandonment opportunity are more attractive than those without, since they are 
exercised earlier because the inevitable downside project value risk is mitigated by the presence 
of the abandonment option. But in reality, the extent of the attractiveness is not substantial. For a 
20% and 40% abandonment threshold, measured as a proportion of the investment cost, the 
project value thresholds are 1.7875 and 1.7510, respectively, which are 99.4% and 97.4% of the 
project value threshold in the absence of any stage-2 abandonment opportunity.  
 
 Figure 1 reveals that for a unit abandonment value threshold, the project value threshold falls to 
76.67% of its level in the absence of stage-2 optionality, but the possibility for a project to 
achieve such a high abandonment value is exceedingly remote. Moreover, the formulation 
excludes any round-tipping potential, where a gain is achievable by making a simultaneous 
investment and abandonment decision. If the investment threshold ratio 
11 11
ˆ ˆv x  is set to equal the 
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abandonment ratio 
12 12
ˆ ˆv x , then the resulting value of 11 0   and the model assumptions break 
down. 
***Figure 1 about here*** 
 
The insubstantial consequential nature of the stage-2 abandonment option is reinforced by 
observing the stage-1 option value. Table 2 compares the stage-1 option values in the absence of 
stage-2 abandonment optionality and in its presence when the abandonment level equals its 
threshold 12ˆ 0.4x  . Despite the abandonment value being set to 40% of the investment cost, this 
table illustrates the closeness of the investment option values for the two cases of an absent and 
present stage-2 abandonment optionality. Although the values are close, the values for the stage-
1 option with stage-2 abandonment optionality are always greater for all displayed project value 
levels. This suggests that the investment opportunity with stage-2 abandonment optionality is 
always more attractive than that without. The positive difference between the with and without 
investment option values varies according to the project value level. The difference declines to 
zero as the project value level approaches zero, since the investment opportunity at these levels is 
equally unattractive irrespective of presence or absence of the stage-2 abandonment optionality. 
However, as the project value level increases towards the project value threshold, the positive 
difference widens reflecting the growing attractiveness of the investment opportunity with 
abandonment optionality, because of the imminent exercise of the investment opportunity in 
conjunction with the floor on the project downside risk. For project value levels greater than the 
threshold, the positive difference begins to decay as the value of the stage-2 abandonment option 
wanes. The investment opportunity in tandem with a stage-2 abandonment optionality is more 
attractive, and because the project downside is somewhat mitigated, the project value threshold is 
consequentially lower which encourages an earlier exercise. Still, the difference between the 
model outcomes with and without abandonment optionality is relatively small.  
 
There is an additional difference between the model outcomes with and without stage-2 
abandonment optionality. Unlike the finding for a standard investment opportunity that project 
value threshold increases are accompanied with option value increases, for Model I, a decrease in 
the project value threshold is associated with an option value increase. Not only does the 
presence of stage-2 abandonment optionality enhance the attractiveness of the investment 
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opportunity, but it also encourages earlier exercise owing to the reduction in the threshold level.  
Whilst being more attractive due to the additional value created by the stage-2 abandonment 
optionality, the investment opportunity is exercised earlier since the stage-2 downside risk is 
partly mitigated by the option to abandon.  
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
A standard real option finding for the effect of a volatility increase is to make the investment 
opportunity appear to be more attractive. The consequence of a volatility rise is to increase the 
project value threshold level and effectively to cause project deferral. This is illustrated in Figure 
2 for the project value volatility, which compares the policy boundary for 20%V   and 
30%V  . This reveals that for all plausible abandonment threshold levels, the project value 
threshold is greater for the higher value volatility boundary
3
. The two policy boundaries do 
intersect, but this occurs only for implausibly high abandonment threshold levels.  
 
Although these results corroborate earlier real option findings, we obtain a contrasting picture 
when the volatility refers to the abandonment value. Figure 3 illustrates the investment policy 
boundary for two distinct values of the abandonment value volatility, 10%X   and 20%X  . 
This reveals that although the difference between the two boundaries is not significant, the 
higher volatility boundary for  plausible abandonment value threshold levels is usually beneath 
the lower volatility boundary. This suggests that a volatility increase may produce a fall in the 
project value threshold and lead to a hastening of the investment exercise. The cause of this 
contrary finding is due to the nature of the compound option. The value of the investment option 
is not only governed by the net value realized on exercise but also by the emergence of the 
embedded abandonment option. Now, the value for this abandonment option is directly related to 
the abandonment value volatility and increases as its volatility increases. As a result, the realized 
net value including the embedded option increases as the abandonment value volatility increases. 
This makes the investment opportunity look more attractive and produces a fall in the project 
value threshold. 
***Figures 2 and 3 about here*** 
                                                 
3
 A similar result is obtained for the investment cost volatility. 
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Volatility expressed as a composite of two factors is also affected by changes in their correlation 
coefficient. The standard result for the investment opportunity with two stochastic factors is that 
any increase in the correlation between the project value and investment cost results in a reduced 
variance of their difference and a lower project value threshold, and makes the opportunity more 
attractive by hastening the exercise. If their correlation is positive, then the project value and 
investment cost can be said to form a natural hedge, since variations in one are mirrored by 
similar variations in the other so a positive change in the investment cost is compensated by a 
similar change in the project value. The effects on the investment policy of a change in the 
correlation between the project value and the abandonment value, and between the investment 
cost and the abandonment value, are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Figure 4 reveals 
that changes in the project value abandonment value correlation has a significant impact on the 
project value threshold. A reduction in the correlation coefficient produces a decrease in the 
project value threshold, so the project value and abandonment value can be said to form a natural 
hedge. This suggests that project value decreases are compensated by abandonment value 
increases and that this economic benefit is reflected in a lower project value threshold level.  In 
contrast, if there is a fall in the compensatory benefit due to a positive correlation change, then 
the project value threshold level increases and becomes less favourable.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the investment cost abandonment value correlation on the 
investment policy and reveals that changes in the correlation coefficient have no significant 
effect on the project value threshold. For extreme but implausible abandonment value threshold 
levels, a positive correlation change does produce a project value threshold decrease. This 
suggests that the investment cost and abandonment value can be said to form a natural hedge and 
that variations in the investment cost are compensated to a degree by like variations in the 
abandonment value. However, for plausible abandonment values, the effect is very small,  an 
expected conclusion. The investment cost is treated as sunk when the abandonment opportunity 
is being assessed by management, so any co-variations between the investment cost and the 
abandonment value are effectively irrelevant. 
***Figures 4 and 5 about here*** 
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2.2 Model II 
Before performing the sensitivity analysis for Model II, the model behaviour under the base case 
values is examined. The model contains 10 unknowns , the 4 thresholds, 
21vˆ , 22vˆ , 21xˆ  and 22xˆ , 
the 4 parameters, 
21 , 22 , 21 and 22 , and the 2 coefficients, 21A and 22A , but it is composed of 8 
constituent equations, (27)-(33) and (36)-(37). We follow a similar procedure as for Model I, 
except that there are two policy boundaries for Model II, one signifying the optimal investment 
exercise and one for the optimal abandonment exercise. The abandonment thresholds, 
21xˆ  and 
22xˆ , are each set to equal a pre-specified value and the resulting project value thresholds levels, 
21vˆ  and 22vˆ , can then be obtained from the constituent equations. By varying the pre-specified 
level, a set of project value thresholds corresponding to each of the abandonment threshold levels 
is generated, from which the two boundaries can be constructed, as illustrated in Figure 6. Again 
the thresholds for the project and abandonment values are measured relative to the investment 
cost threshold. 
***Figure 6 about here*** 
 
There are two thresholds displayed in Figure 6. The upper threshold refers to the optimal 
investment policy, while the lower boundary refers to the optimal abandonment policy. If a pair 
of prevailing project and abandonment values when plotted on the diagram lies on or above the 
upper boundary, then the optimal decision is to exercise the investment option, while if the pair 
lies on or below the lower boundary, then the optimal decision is to exercise the abandonment 
option. If the pair lies between the boundaries, then deferral is the optimal decision. For a 
prevailing investment cost of 1.0 and abandonment value of 0.5, then investment is optimal 
provided the project value exceeds 2.146, abandonment is optimal provided the project value is 
not greater than 0.983 and deferral if otherwise. When the threshold for the abandonment value 
is zero, the project value threshold signifying abandonment collapses also to zero, while that 
signifying investment rebounds to the standard real option solution in the absence of 
abandonment optionality. As the abandonment value threshold is allowed to increase, there is a 
corresponding increase in both the lower and the upper thresholds. Recall that /v V K  is the 
project value intensity and /x X K  is the abandonment value intensity, as in (27).  The vertical 
distance between the upper and lower threshold profiles depicted in Figure 6 varies according to 
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the threshold level for the abandonment value intensity. While the curvature is relatively stronger 
for the lowest levels of the abandonment value intensity threshold as small changes from zero 
produce large changes in the threshold for the project value intensity, for higher thresholds of the 
abandonment value intensity, the upper and lower profiles are approximately linearly parallel. (In 
fact, the upper and lower profiles display a slight bow downwards and upwards, respectively, 
indicating that the vertical distance exhibits a minimum.) If as an approximation the upper and 
lower profiles can be treated as linearly parallel, then their vertical distance depends only on the 
investment cost threshold and not on the abandonment value threshold. Increases in the project 
value thresholds are positively associated with increases in investment cost thresholds, while the 
abandonment value threshold has a neutral impact. Although the thresholds for both the 
abandonment value and the investment cost positively influence the upper and lower thresholds 
levels of the project value, the difference in project value thresholds tends to be positively 
affected only by the investment cost threshold
4
. 
 
The association between the option value and project value is illustrated in Figure 7 for the 
models with and without stage-1 abandonment optionality. The profile for the without model, 
with 22xˆ   equal zero, is the standard result. The profiles for Model II with abandonment 
optionality are constructed for a stage-1 abandonment threshold set equal to 20%, 40% and 60%. 
The figure reveals that increases in either the project value or abandonment value produce an 
increase in the stage-1 option value and make the composite opportunity, a combination of the 
investment and abandonment options, more attractive. An investment opportunity having 
embedded stage-1 abandonment optionality is more valuable than an investment opportunity 
without, and the additional value created by the with abandonment optionality increases for 
increases in the abandonment value volatility. For sufficiently low project values, the option 
value morphs into the set abandonment value at the lower threshold, creating a lower bound on 
the option value. When the project value is sufficiently high, the option value morphs into the net 
project value, the difference between the project value and incurred investment cost, identical in 
form to the finding for the standard investment option except for the difference in threshold 
levels. The option value is bounded at the bottom by a floor level equalling the abandonment 
                                                 
4
 An algebraic explanation is available from the authors. 
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value, but unconstrained at the top by the net project value. Like the standard finding, the option 
value increase due to the abandonment value volatility increase leads to an increase in the project 
value threshold. This suggests that the presence of a stage-1 abandonment value incentivizes 
deferral and leads to a postponement of the eventual exercise, since both the investment option 
and the abandonment are sacrificed at exercise. This result contrasts with the Model I finding 
that option value increases are accompanied with project value threshold decreases. 
 
The total option value, ROV,  as specified in Model II is a composite of two constituent 
elements, representing the option to invest and the option to abandon, respectively. As the 
project value approaches the upper project value threshold level from below, we would expect 
the option to invest element to dominate, while if the project value descends to the lower project 
value threshold level from above, then the option to abandon element is expected to dominate. 
This feature is revealed in Figure 8, which displays for variations in the project value ranging 
between the lower and upper project value threshold levels, the values separately for the two 
constituent elements as well as for the composite option. This shows that the option value 
elements vary in line with expectations. In the vicinity of the lower project value threshold level, 
the value for the abandonment option element is greater than that for the investment option 
element, while the investment option elements dominates in the vicinity of the upper project 
value threshold level. Further, as the project value increases between the specified range, the 
value for the investment option element increases while that for the abandonment element 
decreases. The relative magnitude of the option elements varies for project value changes, which 
reflects the changing propensity for abandoning or investing in the project. 
***Figures 7 and 8 about here*** 
 
A standard real option result affirms that a volatility increase produces a rise in the project value 
threshold that defers the project commitment. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which compares the 
lower and upper policy boundaries for 20%V   and 30%V  . This reveals that both 
boundaries suffer an unfavourable shift. For any given abandonment value threshold level, an 
increase in project value volatility produces a rise in the upper investment opportunity boundary 
and a fall in the lower abandonment opportunity boundary. In essence, the volatility increase 
causes the two boundaries to widen. This suggests that project value volatility increases 
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incentivize deferral. The extent of the deferral, though, is not even and varies with the policy. For 
identical abandonment value threshold levels, the upper boundary shift due to the volatility 
increase is greater than the lower boundary shift, which suggests that the project value volatility 
has a more significant impact on determining the investment commitment decision than on the 
abandonment commitment decision. In complete contrast, the effect of an increase in either the 
abandonment value or the investment cost volatility is almost insignificant
5
. This suggests that 
when the pre-investment abandonment opportunity exists, both the abandonment value volatility 
and the investment cost volatility do not play a significant role in determining the policy 
decision. This finding contrasts with the result for the two factor investment opportunity model 
in the absence of a stage-1 abandonment opportunity, and is probably due to the opposing effects 
experienced by the two individual option values, 
21F  and 22F , when either of the two volatilities 
change in value.  
***Figures 9 and 10 about here*** 
 
A composite volatility change can also be effected by a change in the correlation coefficient 
value. Amongst the more interesting of these is the correlation between the project value and the 
abandonment value. In the lease market for energy and mineral reserves and land market for real 
estate development, but less intensely for the second-hand market for plant and equipment and 
the scrap-metal market for ships, there is a recognized positive correlation between the project 
and abandonment values. Moreover, it is expected that any positive correlation should mitigate 
the potential adverse consequences of a pre-investment abandonment optionality. Figure 10 
illustrates the lower and upper policy boundaries for the cases for zero and perfect positive 
correlation. This reveals that the change in correlation value does not have a significant effect on 
the general shape of the boundaries. More significantly, for any abandonment value threshold, 
the correlation coefficient increase lowers the investment threshold for the project value, which 
makes the project appear to be more attractive. This suggests that an increase in the correlation 
coefficient between the project and abandonment values mitigates the adverse effects of the pre-
investment abandonment optionality. At the same time, a correlation coefficient increase raises 
                                                 
5
 All of these numerical results are available from the authors. 
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the abandonment threshold for the project value, which makes the abandonment opportunity 
appear to be less attractive.  
 
3 Conclusion 
We formulate two real-option models for studying the impact of abandonment optionality on the 
investment decision. The models include three distinct but positive stochastic factors so that the 
individual and joint effects of the project value, investment cost and abandonment value on the 
investment decision can be investigated. We present a quasi-analytical solution that is 
straightforward and precise. Amongst real option formulations, a three stochastic factor model is 
far from common, and wherever they appear are solved purely by numerical means. 
Abandonment is classified as occurring either immediately after making the investment, during 
stage-2, which is the specification for Model I, or sometime before the exercise, during stage-1, 
which is the specification for Model II.  
 
For Model I, where the abandonment opportunity occurs during stage-2, the optionality arises as 
a consequence of making the investment expenditure and managing an active operating asset. 
Since the abandonment option is embedded in the net project value, its presence yields a net 
project value and therefore an investment option value greater than that when the abandonment 
optionality is absent. This makes the project appear to be more attractive. It results in a lower 
project value threshold than for when the optionality is absent and increases the willingness to 
invest in the project opportunity. The finding of a negative association between the investment 
option value and the project value threshold contrasts with the standard investment opportunity 
result that the option value and project value threshold are positively associated. However, there 
is only a small difference between the results for an investment opportunity model with stage-2 
abandonment optionality and one without for the base case parameter values. For many cases, 
stage-2 abandonment optionality as specified in this paper can be safely ignored. 
 
For Model II, the abandonment opportunity occurs during stage-1. This pre-investment 
abandonment optionality reflects the simultaneous presence of an option to divest the project 
opportunity before making the investment. In making an optimal decision, the value of the 
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abandonment option has to be considered as well as the value of the investment decision. 
Consequently, both the investment and abandonment options have to be sacrificed to obtain 
either the net project value, if the investment option is exercised, or the abandonment value, if 
the abandonment option is exercised. This results in a greater composite option value than when 
the stage-1 abandonment optionality is absent, which means that an investment opportunity 
having a pre-investment abandonment option is more valuable. This yields a greater project 
value threshold and decreases the willingness to invest in the project opportunity.  
 
Based on our numerical illustration, of the two forms of abandonment opportunity, pre-
investment abandonment appears to be more significant because of its greater impact on the 
investment decision. Although more attention is devoted to stage-2 abandonment optionality in 
the literature, its impact on the investment option value and project value threshold seems to be 
quite small. In contrast, pre-investment abandonment optionality has a much greater impact on 
the investment decision and deserves greater attention. 
 
Extending work on abandonment options given a mean reverting process for the project value 
might consider stochastic (even mean reverting) abandonment costs.   Further simulations using 
our models might consider large negative drifts for V (where there is physical deterioration), 
risk-adjusted and correlated drifts, technological obsolescence, and tax and regulatory incentives.  
Eventually there will be complex abandonment models, with other options such as second-hand 
sales and repurchases, and embedded options of stochastic contracting, expansion and stochastic 
operating costs.  Finally, our models ignore multiple investment and abandonment opportunities, 
where the option holder might have a perpetual option to renew investments, or alternatively 
where there might be some probability of the option holder losing a perceived investment 
opportunity or even an abandonment option.  
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Table 1 
Base Case Values 
 
V  20.0% 
X  10.0% 
K  5.0% 
VX  0.0 
VK  0.0 
XK  0.0 
V  0.0% 
X  0.0% 
K  0.0% 
r  6.0% 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Option Values Without and With 
Stage-2 Abandonment Optionality 
 
 
 
Project 
Value 
Option Value 
 
Project 
Value 
Option Value 
Without With Without With 
0.0 0.00000 0.00000 
 
1.6 0.61353 0.63417 
0.1 0.00119 0.00123 
 
1.7 0.70333 0.72700 
0.2 0.00566 0.00585 
 
1.8 0.80000 0.81684 
0.3 0.01412 0.01459 
 
1.9 0.90000 0.91585 
0.4 0.02700 0.02790 
 
2.0 1.00000 1.01496 
0.5 0.04463 0.04612 
 
2.1 1.10000 1.11416 
0.6 0.06731 0.06956 
 
2.2 1.20000 1.21343 
0.7 0.09526 0.09845 
 
2.3 1.30000 1.31277 
0.8 0.12870 0.13301 
 
2.4 1.40000 1.41218 
0.9 0.16781 0.17344 
 
2.5 1.50000 1.51163 
1.0 0.21278 0.21991 
 
2.6 1.60000 1.61113 
1.1 0.26375 0.27260 
 
2.7 1.70000 1.71066 
1.2 0.32087 0.33165 
 
2.8 1.80000 1.81023 
1.3 0.38429 0.39720 
 
2.9 1.90000 1.90984 
1.4 0.45412 0.46939 
 
3.0 2.00000 2.00947 
1.5 0.53050 0.54834 
 
3.1 2.10000 2.10912 
 
 
The option value without stage-2 abandonment optionality is determined from the standard 
solution, which is identical to the Model I solution with 12 0A   or X=0. This yields 
11 2.25315  , 11 0.21278A   and 11ˆ 1.79800v  . The option value with stage-2 abandonment 
optionality is the Model I solution evaluated for 12 12ˆ 0.4x x  . This yields 12 0.22967A  , 
12 1.12788    and 12 2.12788   at stage-2, and 11 2.25335  , 11 0.04812  , 11 0.22983A   
and 11ˆ 1.75098v   at stage-1. 
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Figure 1 
Project Value Threshold versus the Abandonment Threshold 
for Model I 
 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1, from the 3 
constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 reduced form value matching relationships, (19) and (20), 
and (iii) the Q   function, (21). Some illustrative values are presented in the following table: 
 
11xˆ  11vˆ  11  11  
0.0 1.7980 2.2531 0.0000 
0.2 1.7875 2.2532 0.0104 
0.4 1.7510 2.2534 0.0481 
0.6 1.6819 2.2529 0.1265 
0.8 1.5681 2.2489 0.2798 
1.0 1.3785 2.2253 0.6319 
1.2 0.9702 1.7946 2.3255 
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Figure 2 
Impact of Project Value Volatility on Investment Policy for Model I 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 
adding V=.3, from the 3 constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 reduced form value 
matching relationships, (19) and (20), and (iii) the Q   function, (21). 
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Figure 3 
Impact of Abandonment Value Volatility on Investment Policy for Model I 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 
adding X=.2, from the 3 constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 reduced form value 
matching relationships, (19) and (20), and (iii) the Q   function,(21). 
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Figure 4 
Impact of Project Value Abandonment Value Correlation on Investment Policy 
for Model I 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 
adding VX=.5 and VX=-.5, from the 3 constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 reduced 
form value matching relationships, (19) and (20), and (iii) the Q   function,(21). 
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Figure 5 
Impact of Investment Cost Abandonment Value Correlation on Investment Policy 
for Model I 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 
adding KX=.5 and KX=-.5, from the 3 constituent equations: (i) and (ii) the 2 reduced 
form value matching relationships, (19) and (20), and (iii) the Q   function,(21). 
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Figure 6 
Project Value Thresholds versus the Abandonment Threshold for Model II 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 
1 and equations 27-29, 31-33 and 36-37, setting the abandonment thresholds to 
pre-specified values, ranging from 0 to 1. 
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Figure 7 
The Association between Option Value and Project Value for Model II 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 and 
equations 27-29, 31-33 and 36-37, setting x22=0, and x21 to the pre-specified values of 
0, .2, .4 and .6, and the ROV is calculated using equation 21. 
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Figure 8 
Composite Option Value and Constituent Elements  
between the Lower and Upper Project Value Threshold Levels for Model II 
 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1 and equations 
27-29, 31-33 and 36-37, setting x22 and x21 to the pre-specified values of  .4 , and the ROV is 
calculated using equation 21. 
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Figure 9 
Project Value Thresholds versus the Abandonment Threshold for Model II 
For Variations in Project Value Volatility 
 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1, 
adding V=.3, using equations 27-29, 31-33 and 36-37, setting x22 and x21 to the pre-
specified values of  .4 . 
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Figure 10 
Project Value Thresholds versus the Abandonment Threshold for Model II 
For Variations in the Project Value Abandonment Value Correlation 
 
The threshold boundary values are calculated using the values presented in Table 1, 
adding VX=1, using equations 27-29, 31-33 and 36-37, setting x22 and x21 to the pre-
specified values of  .4 . 
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